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SHOW  ME  THE  MONEY:  ON  WHETHER  CAR
DEALERSHIP  SERVICE  ADVISORS  ARE
ENTITLED  TO  OR  EXEMPT  FROM
OVERTIME  PAY  UNDER  THE  FLSA
Seth Andrew Yarkony*
INTRODUCTION
Mercedes-Benz of Encino (“MB Encino”) has served the San Fernando
Valley region of greater Los Angeles since 1964.1  The swanky, community-
focused dealership invites individuals to stop by and enjoy a cup of coffee
while browsing its showroom and gift boutique,2 and proudly shares on
Instagram images of social events and customers enjoying its luxury automo-
biles.3  An interactive enterprise, MB Encino also uses social media to feature
friendly photos of employees and depicts employee portraits on its website.4
While MB Encino and its employees have joined forces to bring together
individuals in the San Fernando Valley community, a recent dispute involving
the dealership and a subset of its employees—this time as adverse parties—
has caused a rift in the legal community.  In Navarro v. Encino Motorcars,
LLC,5 Hector Navarro, Mike Shirinian, Anthony Pinkins, Kevin Malone, and
Reuben Castro, all “service advisors” at MB Encino, sued the dealership alleg-
* J.D. Candidate, University of Notre Dame Law School, 2017; B.S., Finance and
Management & Leadership, Boston College, 2014.  I would like to thank Professor Barbara
Fick for her thoughtful and challenging guidance, the members of the
Notre Dame Law Review for their editorial assistance, and my grandfather Charles
Kohlmeyer, who has the same enthusiasm for this Note as he did every baseball, soccer,
and basketball game I played growing up—none of which he missed.  This Note is
dedicated to my family.
1 About Us, MERCEDES-BENZ OF ENCINO, http://www.mbencino.com/about-us/ (last
visited Mar. 20, 2016).
2 Id.
3 Mercedes-Benz of Encino in LA (@mercedes818), INSTAGRAM, https://instagram
.com/mercedes818/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2016).  Events hosted by MB Encino include a
ladies-only charity gala, a promotional function for the automaker’s 2014 S-Class line, and
Friday night musical performances. Id.
4 Id.; Staff, MERCEDES-BENZ OF ENCINO, http://www.mbencino.com/staff/ (last visited
Mar. 20, 2016).
5 780 F.3d 1267 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro
(2016).
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ing it had violated the Fair Labor Standards Act6 (FLSA) by failing to pay
time and one-half overtime wages.7  To determine MB Encino’s liability, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had to weigh the reason-
ableness of a Department of Labor (DOL) regulation that effectively entitles
service advisors to time and one-half overtime pay.
The FLSA overtime-pay requirement “mandat[es] that all hours worked
in excess of 40 hours [in a seven-day work week] be paid at one and one-half
(150%) of the employee’s normal hourly rate.”8  However, the overtime
requirement does not apply to a host of exempted employees across various
industries.9  As set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(10)(A) (the “Dealership
6 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2012).  A central element of the New Deal, the FLSA,
enacted in 1938, “has three objectives: [(1)] to establish minimum wages [29 U.S.C.
§ 206], [(2)] to discourage the employment of workers for long hours [29 U.S.C.
§ 207] . . . and [(3)] to discourage the employment of ‘oppressive child labor’ [29 U.S.C.
§ 212].”  E. Merrick Dodd, The Supreme Court and Fair Labor Standards, 1941–1945, 59 HARV.
L. REV. 321, 321 (1946) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 212(c)).  The law “was intended to lessen the
effects of the Great Depression by creating an incentive for businesses to hire more
employees.” ROBERT K. ROBINSON & GERALYN MCCLURE FRANKLIN, EMPLOYMENT REGULA-
TION IN THE WORKPLACE 240 (2d ed. 2015).
7 Encino Motorcars, 780 F.3d at 1269–70.
8 AM. FED’N OF GOV’T EMPS., FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT MANUAL 2, http://
www.afge477.org/flsaguide.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2016).  The time and one-half over-
time pay requirement, codified in 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1), “creat[es] an incentive for busi-
nesses to hire more employees” by penalizing employers for workers employed more than
40 hours during a 168-hour workweek. ROBINSON & FRANKLIN, supra note 6, at 240.  For
example, if an employer has one employee who works 80 hours a week at a rate of $10 per
hour, the FLSA requires a weekly pay of $1,000 ($10 × 40 hours + $15 × 40 hours).  “To
avoid the overtime penalty, the employer is limited to two options.  He or she could reduce
the hours worked by his or her current employee[].  The option presents the obvious
downside of there being not enough man-hours to complete the scheduled work.” Id. at
241.  Alternatively, the “other option offered an economically sound way to avoid the over-
time penalty by increasing the size of the workforce by hiring more employees.” Id.  Thus,
in our example, if the employer hired one more worker, he or she would be able to accom-
plish 80 man-hours of work while simultaneously reducing payroll costs; the cost of employ-
ing two workers at 40 hours per week is $800 ($10 × 40 hours + $10 × 40 hours).  This
results in a 20% savings as compared to a workforce of one employee working 40 hours per
week.  “The idea was that this would create more employment for Americans during the
Great Depression when over one-third of all workers were without jobs.” Id.
9 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)–(b).  Employees listed under § 213(a) are exempt from both the
minimum wage and time and one-half overtime requirements of the FLSA.  On the other
hand, employees listed under § 213(b) are exempt only from the law’s overtime require-
ment.  With respect to overtime exemptions (the focus of this Note), the intent behind
their existence is debated.  The DOL has noted that “specific references . . . in the legisla-
tive history are scant” regarding the § 213(a)(1) exemption for executive, administrative,
and professional workers.  Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, Admin-
istrative, Professional, Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 69 Fed. Reg. 22122, 22123
(Apr. 23, 2004) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 541).  Nevertheless, the DOL suggests these
employees were exempted because “the type of work they perform[] was difficult to stand-
ardize to any time frame and could not be easily spread to other workers after 40 hours in a
week, making compliance with the overtime provisions difficult and generally precluding
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Employee Exemption” or the “Exemption”), one such employee that is not
entitled to time and one-half overtime pay is, “any salesman, partsman, or
mechanic primarily engaged in selling or servicing automobiles, trucks, or
farm implements, if he is employed by a nonmanufacturing establishment
primarily engaged in the business of selling such vehicles or implements to
ultimate purchasers.”10
Administration of the FLSA, and thus interpretation of its exemptions, is
carried out by the DOL’s Wage and Hour Division, which the Act created.11
The DOL’s interpretation of the Dealership Employee Exemption, as set
forth in 29 C.F.R. § 779.372 (the “DOL Dealership Regulation” or the “Regu-
lation”), has always considered service advisors, who are broadly defined as
dealership employees responsible for diagnosing and soliciting repair and
maintenance services for vehicles,12 as outside the definition of
“salesm[e]n . . . primarily engaged in selling or servicing automobiles,” and
therefore entitled to time and one-half overtime pay.13
Agency regulations duly promulgated after a notice-and-comment
period, such as the DOL Dealership Regulation,14 are subject to the deferen-
tial standard of review set forth in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.15  Under this standard, commonly known as Chevron def-
the potential job expansion intended by the FLSA[].” Id. at 22124. Cf. Natalie Slavens
Abbott, Comment, To Pay or Not to Pay: Modernizing the Overtime Provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 253, 257 & n.40 (1998) (indicating exemptions for
employees in “highly specific industries”—such as “persons employed in the catching, cul-
tivating, or first canning of fish or shellfish; employees of local newspapers with circula-
tions of less than four thousand; . . . employees engaged in the processing of maple sap
into sugar or syrup; and taxicab operators”—arise from the efforts of special-interest lobby-
ing groups); see also infra text accompanying note 185 (discussing the potential impact of
lobbyists in enactment of the Dealership Employee Exemption).  For an excellent sum-
mary of employees who are exempt from FLSA requirements, see BARBARA KATE REPA,
YOUR RIGHTS IN THE WORKPLACE 9–12 (8th ed. 2007).
10 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(10)(A) (2012).
11 Id. § 204.
12 See DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HAND-
BOOK, 1980–81 EDITION 191–92 (1980); Neil G. Chirico & Joanne Helperin, Roles of the
Dealership Staff . . . Who Does What?, EDMUNDS.COM (May 5, 2009), http://www.edmunds
.com/car-care/roles-of-the-dealership-service-staff-who-does-what.html.  Service advisors
have also commonly been referred to as “service manager,” “service writer,” and “service
salesman.” See infra text accompanying notes 43, 52, 55, 158.
13 See 29 C.F.R. § 779.372 (2011); 29 C.F.R. § 779.372 (1973); 29 C.F.R. § 779.372
(1972).  Although the text of the 1970s regulations varies from that of the 2011 regulation,
the regulation’s substantive position with respect to service advisors remains the same.
Navarro v. Encino Motorcars, LLC, 780 F.3d 1267, 1272 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[The] regulatory
definitions [of ‘salesman,’ ‘partsman,’ and ‘mechanic’] have not changed in any relevant
way since 1970.”).
14 Encino Motorcars, 780 F.3d at 1272 (“The regulation was adopted by the responsible
federal agency through notice and comment rulemaking.”).
15 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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erence, “legislative regulations are given controlling weight”16 if a two-part
test is satisfied.  First, the court must determine that “the statute [interpreted
by the regulation] is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue.”17
Second, the regulation must be reasonable in that it is not “arbitrary, capri-
cious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”18  In addition to the standard set
forth in Chevron, the Supreme Court has dictated that “[FLSA] exemptions
are to be narrowly construed against the employers seeking to assert them
and their application limited to those [contexts] plainly and unmistakably
within their terms and spirit.”19
Accordingly, in Encino Motorcars, the Ninth Circuit had to determine
whether the DOL Dealership Regulation should be afforded Chevron defer-
ence.20  The Ninth Circuit panel unanimously held that it should21—i.e.,
that the DOL Dealership Regulation, which excludes service advisors from
the Exemption’s definition of “salesman,” is a reasonable interpretation of
the Dealership Employee Exemption.  As a result, MB Encino (and other car
dealerships in the Ninth Circuit) may not rely on the Dealership Employee
Exemption to refuse time and one-half overtime pay to service advisors.
16 Id. at 844.  As discussed in Section I.C below, the Fourth Circuit found the DOL
Dealership Regulation to be interpretive rather than legislative and reviewed the Regulation
under a standard less deferential than that of Chevron.  Three years after the Fourth Cir-
cuit’s decision, the Supreme Court held that interpretive regulations are reviewed under
Chevron “[w]here an agency rule sets forth important individual rights and duties, where
the agency focuses fully and directly upon the issue, where the agency uses full notice-and-
comment procedures to promulgate a rule, [and] where the resulting rule falls within the
statutory grant of authority.”  Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 173
(2007). Chevron is a highly deferential standard of review. See infra note 164.  This Note
argues that the DOL Dealership Regulation cannot be afforded deference even under this
most deferential standard.  Therefore, this Note proceeds under the assumption that the
DOL Dealership Regulation, if interpretive rather than legislative, satisfies the Long Island
Care at Home requirements and is thus entitled to Chevron scrutiny.  Since the DOL Dealer-
ship Regulation cannot pass Chevron muster, it also would not satisfy less deferential stan-
dards of review.  Accordingly, even if the Supreme Court reviewed the DOL Dealership
Regulation under a standard less deferential than Chevron, the DOL Dealership Regulation
would remain unreasonable.
17 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
18 Id. at 844.  In Chevron cases, the Supreme Court will hold an agency interpretation
“manifestly contrary” to the statute when it determines there is “ ‘unambiguous congres-
sional intention’ contrary to the agency’s interpretation of the statute.”  Dudley D.
McCalla, Deference (and Related Issues), 14 TEX. TECH. ADMIN. L.J. 363, 388 (2013) (quoting
Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 470 U.S. 116, 129 (1985)).  For further read-
ing on courts’ application of the “arbitrary” and “capricious” standards, see id.
19 Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392 (1960).
20 Encino Motorcars, 780 F.3d at 1271 (“We conduct the familiar two-step inquiry to
determine whether to defer to the agency’s interpretation.”).
21 Id. at 1277 (“[W]e hold that Plaintiffs are not exempt under 29 U.S.C.
§ 213(b)(10)(A).”).
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The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Encino Motorcars directly conflicts with
prior decisions in the Fourth and Fifth Circuits—resulting in a circuit split.22
In Brennan v. Deel Motors, Inc.,23 the Fifth Circuit rejected the DOL Dealer-
ship Regulation, reasoning “a common sense interpretation and application
of [the Dealership Employee Exemption] mandates inclusion of service
[advisors] within its scope.”24  Similarly, in Walton v. Greenbrier Ford, Inc.,25
the Fourth Circuit concluded “the [DOL Dealership Regulation] is flatly con-
trary to the [Dealership Employee Exemption’s] text.”26  In holding the
opposite, the Encino Motorcars court found that “there are two reasonable
ways to read the [Dealership Employee Exemption].”27  Focusing on the “pri-
marily engaged in” language of the Exemption, the Encino court found rea-
sonable the DOL’s determination that service advisors are not “salesm[e]n”
because “[i]t is hard to imagine, in ordinary speech, a ‘salesman . . . primarily
engaged in . . . servicing automobiles.’”28
On January 15, 2016, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to MB
Encino’s appeal of the Ninth Circuit’s judgment.29  This is not the first time
the Court has been presented a circuit split over an FLSA exemption for
employees categorized as “salesmen.”  In its 2012 decision in Christopher v.
22 Michael Warren & Benjamin Emmert, Ninth Circuit Finds Auto ‘Service Advisors’ Not
Exempt Under FLSA, LITTLER MENDELSON (Mar. 31, 2015), https://www.littler.com/ninth-
circuit-finds-auto-service-advisors-not-exempt-under-flsa.
23 475 F.2d 1095 (5th Cir. 1973).  Effective as of October 1, 1981, the Fifth Circuit was
divided into two circuits: the Fifth Circuit and a new Eleventh Circuit.  Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat. 1994.  Under the rule
set forth in Bonner v. City of Prichard, the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Deel Motors is also bind-
ing precedent in the Eleventh Circuit. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207
(11th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (“[T]he decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit . . . as that court existed on September 30, 1981, handed down by that court
prior to the close of business on that date, shall be binding as precedent in the Eleventh
Circuit.”).
24 Deel Motors, 475 F.2d at 1097.
25 370 F.3d 446 (4th Cir. 2004).  The decision in Encino Motorcars also directly conflicts
with several U.S. district courts and the Montana Supreme Court.  One conflicting case is
an unreported decision from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
that was affirmed without opinion by the Sixth Circuit. See Brennan v. North Bros. Ford,
Inc., No. 40344, 1975 WL 1074 (E.D. Mich. 1975), aff’d sub nom. Dunlop v. North Bros.
Ford, Inc. 529 F.2d 524 (6th Cir. 1976) (Table).  Other decisions at the district court level
at odds with Encino Motorcars—and thus aligned with Deel Motors and Greenbrier Ford—
include Yenney v. Cass Cty. Motors Co., No. 76-0-294, 1977 WL 1678 (D. Neb. Feb. 8, 1977),
and Brennan v. Import Volkswagen, Inc., No. W-4982, 1975 WL 1248 (D. Kan. Oct. 21, 1975).
The Montana Supreme Court held service advisors are exempt from the FLSA’s overtime
provisions in Thompson v. J.C. Billion, Inc., 294 P.3d 397, 402 (Mont. 2013).
26 Greenbrier Ford, 370 F.3d at 451.
27 Navarro v. Encino Motorcars, LLC, 780 F.3d 1267, 1277 (9th Cir. 2015).
28 Id. at 1275.
29 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 2016 WL 205945
(No. 15-415); Orders in Pending Cases, U.S. SUPREME COURT (Jan. 15, 2016), http://
www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/011516zr_l5gm.pdf.
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SmithKline Beecham Corp.,30 the Court resolved a split between the Second and
Ninth Circuits over the FLSA’s “outside salesman” exemption.31  In a 5-4
vote, a divided Court held “pharmaceutical sales representatives whose pri-
mary duty is to obtain nonbinding commitments from physicians to prescribe
their employer’s prescription drugs” qualify as outside salesmen exempt from
time and one-half overtime pay.32
This decision had significant repercussions.  The Christopher majority rec-
ognized the “more than 90,000 [pharmaceutical sales representatives]
nationwide” to which its holding denied time and one-half overtime compen-
sation.33  Supreme Court resolution of the disagreed-upon exemption for
service advisors will have similar consequences: in its petition for writ of certi-
orari, MB Encino estimated nearly 45,000 service advisors are employed by
18,000 car dealerships nationwide.34
This Note analyzes the merits of the Encino Motorcars, Deel Motors, and
Greenbrier Ford decisions in light of the text and legislative history of the Deal-
ership Employee Exemption and Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.  Part I
summarizes the Exemption, the DOL Dealership Regulation interpreting the
Exemption, and the decisions whether to defer to the DOL Dealership Regu-
lation by the Encino Motorcars, Deel Motors, and Greenbrier Ford courts.  Part II
analyzes the text and legislative history of the Exemption, and concludes that
the DOL Dealership Regulation should not be afforded Chevron deference
because it is manifestly contrary to the Exemption.  Part III considers the
Exemption in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Christopher, and
advances additional reasons for why the Court, when deciding Encino Motor-
cars, should side with the interpretation of the Dealership Employee Exemp-
tion advanced by the Fourth and Fifth Circuits.
I. THE EXEMPTION, DOL REGULATION, AND THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Although the FLSA was enacted in 1938, the Dealership Employee
Exemption came about nearly thirty years later as part of the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Amendments of 1966.35  The Exemption was codified in 29 U.S.C.
§ 213(b)(10)(A).
An employee is understood to be ineligible for overtime under the
Exemption if he or she satisfies two requirements.  First—the noncontrover-
sial aspect of the Exemption—the employee must be “employed by a non-
manufacturing establishment primarily engaged in the business of selling
such vehicles or implements to ultimate purchasers.”36  The DOL Dealership
Regulation interpreting this requirement has long held that an employer sat-
30 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012).
31 Id. at 2164–65.  The outside salesman exemption is codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 213(a)(1) (2012).
32 Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2161.
33 Id. at 2164.
34 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 29, at 3.
35 Pub. L. No. 89-601, § 209, 80 Stat. 830, 836 (1966).
36 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(10)(A).
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isfies this definition if “over half of the [employer’s] annual dollar volume of
sales made or business done [comes] from sales of the enumerated vehi-
cles.”37  Courts nationwide, without reference to the DOL Dealership Regula-
tion, commonly agree that most car dealerships (as nonmanufacturing
establishments that are primarily engaged in selling vehicles to the ultimate
purchaser) are employers that meet this requirement.38
The second—highly controversial (in the interpretive sense)—require-
ment of the Exemption is that the employee of the car dealership must be a
“salesman, partsman, or mechanic primarily engaged in selling or servicing
automobiles.”39  The way in which this phrase is interpreted is decisive in the
determination of whether service advisors are included within the scope of
the Exemption.40  This Part analyzes how the DOL has historically inter-
preted this requirement and the conflicting decisions of federal appellate
courts regarding whether to afford deference to the DOL Dealership
Regulation.
A. DOL Regulation of the Exemption
Since the 1966 enactment of the Dealership Employee Exemption, the
DOL has gone back-and-forth in its opinion whether service advisors are
included as exempt salesmen.41  The DOL’s formal regulatory position set
forth in the Code of Federal Regulations, however, has always reflected the
belief that service advisors are not exempt salesmen, and therefore may not
be denied time and one-half overtime pay.42
The DOL’s initial interpretation of the Dealership Employee Exemp-
tion, which came in a July 1967 opinion letter from the Administrator of the
37 29 C.F.R. § 779.372(d) (2011); 29 C.F.R. § 779.372(d) (1971).
38 See, e.g., Navarro v. Encino Motorcars, LLC, 780 F.3d 1267, 1270 (9th Cir. 2015);
McBeth v. Gabrielli Truck Sales, Ltd., 768 F. Supp. 2d 383, 388 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); Yenney v.
Cass Cty. Motors Co., No. 76-0-294, 1977 WL 1678, at *1 n.1 (D. Neb. Feb. 8, 1977); Atkins
v. Old River Supply, Inc., 150 So. 3d 976, 980 (Miss. Ct. App. 2014) (“[T]he exemption
acknowledges that dealerships do more than just sell cars.  So what matters is that the
dealership be primarily engaged in selling vehicles, and not simply selling vehicles to a
limited extent.” (citation omitted)).
39 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(10)(A).
40 The DOL Dealership Regulation states, “primarily engaged means the major part or
over 50 percent of the salesman’s, partsman’s, or mechanic’s time must be spent in selling
or servicing the enumerated vehicles.”  29 C.F.R. § 779.372(d) (2011) (emphasis added).
Thus, with respect to exempt dealership employees, the phrase has dual meaning.  First,
like the requirement that an Exemption-subject dealership be an establishment in which
over half the annual dollar volume of business comes from sales of vehicles, an exempt
salesman, partsman, or mechanic is one who spends greater than 50 percent of his or her
time selling or servicing vehicles.  Second, however, there is disagreement among courts
“whether . . . [the] ‘primarily engaged in selling or servicing’ [requirement] refers to the
act of personally selling or servicing automobiles or instead to ‘the general business’ of
selling or servicing automobiles.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 29, at 13–14.
41 Encino Motorcars, 780 F.3d at 1272–73.
42 See supra text accompanying note 13.
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Wage and Hour Division, concluded that service advisors are exempt employ-
ees.43  However, in August 1967, less than one month later, a different opin-
ion letter from the Administrator concluded the opposite: “Employees
variously described as . . . service advisor . . . [do] not qualify for exemption
under [the Dealership Employee Exemption].”44
The text and substance of the August 1967 opinion letter—which did
not provide much, if any, support for its conclusions—was largely incorpo-
rated into the original version of the DOL Dealership Regulation, promul-
gated in 1970.45  In relevant part, the original DOL Dealership Regulation
explained:
As used in [the Dealership Employee Exemption], a salesman is an
employee who is employed for the purpose of and is primarily engaged in
making sales or obtaining orders or contracts for sale of the vehicles or farm
implements which the establishment is primarily engaged in selling. . . .
As used in [the Dealership Employee Exemption], a partsman is any
employee employed for the purpose of and primarily engaged in requisition-
ing, stocking, and dispensing parts.
As used in [the Dealership Employee Exemption], a mechanic is any
employee primarily engaged in doing mechanical work (such as get ready
mechanics, automotive . . . mechanics, body or fender mechanics, used car
reconditioning mechanics, and wrecker mechanics) in the servicing of an
automobile . . . for its use and operation as such. . . .
Employees variously described as . . . service advisor . . . who are not
themselves primarily engaged in the work of a salesman, partsman, or
mechanic as described above are not exempt under [the Dealership Employee
Exemption].  This is true despite the fact that such an employee’s principal
function may be disagnosing [sic] the mechanical condition of vehicles
brought in for repair, writing up work orders for repairs authorized by the
customer, assigning the work to various employees and directing and check-
ing on the work of mechanics.
As used in [the Dealership Employee Exemption], primarily engaged
means the major part or over 50 percent of the salesman’s[,] partsman’s, or
mechanic’s time must be spent in selling or servicing the enumerated
vehicles.46
Thus, the original DOL Dealership Regulation explicitly took the position
that service advisors were not exempt salesmen.
Since the Regulation’s initial promulgation in 1970, as the Encino Motor-
cars court noted, “the Department of Labor occasionally has adopted []
broader definitions [of salesman] . . . in documents other than regula-
43 U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Opinion Letter (July 6, 1967) (“The man-
ager of a service department of an automobile dealership who is primarily engaged in
diagnosing the mechanical condition of care brought in for repair . . . would be exempt from
the overtime pay requirements of the [FLSA].” (emphasis added)).
44 U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Opinion Letter (Aug. 4, 1967) (emphasis
added).
45 See id.; 29 C.F.R. § 779.372 (1971); Fair Labor Standards Act as Applied to Retailers
of Goods or Services, 35 Fed. Reg. 5856, 5895–96 (Apr. 9, 1970).
46 29 C.F.R. § 779.372(c)–(d) (1971) (emphases added).
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tions.”47  For example, in a 1978 opinion letter, the Wage and Hour Division
stated “[o]ur present position is that employees variously described as . . .
service advisor . . . may qualify for [the Dealership Employee Exemption].”48
In 1987, the Wage and Hour Division amended its Field Operations Hand-
book to state that service advisors are “construed as within the [E]xemption,”
and that it would revise the DOL Dealership Regulation to reflect this posi-
tion “as soon as is practicable.”49
It is difficult to determine whether 2008 was as soon as practicable for
the DOL to revise the Dealership Regulation to reflect the position set forth
in its 1987 Handbook, but that is when the agency first proposed amending
the formal regulation to reflect a broader definition of “salesman,” one that
would officially include service advisors within the Exemption.50  In doing so,
the DOL acknowledged its lingering 1987 position and asserted its desire to
conform to the then-existing (pre-Encino Motorcars) uniformity among the
courts as to the exemption of service advisors from entitlement to overtime
pay.51
The DOL never formally adopted its proposed amendment to the Deal-
ership Regulation.  Instead, in 2011, the agency ultimately decided against
adopting the 2008 proposal.52  In explaining its decision, the DOL recog-
nized compelling arguments of both supporters and opponents of the 2008
proposal.53  The DOL concluded the then-current Dealership Regulation,
47 780 F.3d 1267, 1273 (9th Cir. 2015).
48 U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Opinion Letter (July 28, 1978).
49 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE & HOUR DIV., FIELD OPERATIONS HANDBOOK, at 24L04–4
(1987), https://www.dol.gov/whd/FOH/FOH_Ch24.pdf.
50 Updating Regulations Issued Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 73 Fed. Reg.
43654, 43658–59, 43671 (proposed July 28, 2008).  The proposed DOL Dealership Regula-
tion reads as follows: “Employees variously described as . . . service advisor . . . are exempt
under [the Dealership Employee Exemption].” Id. at 43671 (emphasis added).
51 Id. at 43658–59 (noting that “[u]niform appellate and district court decisions . . .
hold that service advisors are exempt . . . because they are ‘salesmen’ who are primarily
engaged in ‘servicing’ automobiles,” and that “[b]ased upon the court decisions, the
[DOL] has adopted an enforcement position since 1987 that . . . the regulation would be
revised” (first citing Walton v. Greenbrier Ford, Inc., 370 F.3d 446 (4th Cir. 2004); Bren-
nan v. Deel Motors, Inc., 475 F.2d 1095 (5th Cir. 1973); Brennan v. North Bros. Ford, Inc.,
No. 40344, 1975 WL 1074 (E.D. Mich. 1975), aff’d sub nom. Dunlop v. North Bros. Ford,
Inc., 529 F.2d 524 (6th Cir. 1976) (Table)).
52 Updating Regulations Issued Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 76 Fed. Reg.
18832, 18833, 18837–38 (Apr. 5, 2011) (“The Department is . . . not proceeding with the
proposed rule that service managers, service writers, service advisors, and service salesman
are exempted from the overtime provision.”).
53 Id. at 18838.  One supporter, nationwide labor and employment law firm Littler
Mendelson, P.C., argued the 2008 proposal would eliminate confusion between the 1987
Field Operations Handbook and the existing DOL Dealership Regulation, and would not
be a change in the law. Id.  Twelve members of Congress—a group that included Senators
Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton, Edward Kennedy, and Bernie Sanders—stated they were
“deeply troubled” with the proposal because it would “abandon [the DOL’s] longstanding
and correct interpretation of [the Dealership Employee Exemption]” set forth in the DOL
Dealership Regulation and would “ignore[] the Supreme Court’s command that FLSA
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which “limit[ed] the [E]xemption to salesmen who sell vehicles and
partsmen and mechanics who service vehicles” was reasonable, and that it no
longer agreed with the Fourth Circuit’s holding in Walton v. Greenbrier Ford,
Inc., which held that the regulation “impermissibly narrows” the Dealership
Employee Exemption.54
Somewhat ironically, in 2011, the same time the DOL decided against
including service advisors within the Exemption, the agency officially removed
from the Dealership Regulation the paragraph that explicitly placed service
advisors outside the Exemption.55  The removal of this paragraph, however,
did not amount to a change in position by the DOL.56  Instead, the DOL
slightly adjusted the Dealership Regulation’s definitions of “salesman,”
“partsman,” and “mechanic,” none of which include service advisors within
their scope.57
Three federal appellate courts have considered whether the DOL Deal-
ership Regulation reasonably excludes car dealership service advisors from
the scope of the Dealership Employee Exemption—two of them found it
does not.58
B. Brennan v. Deel Motors, Inc. (Fifth Circuit)
In Brennan v. Deel Motors, Inc., the Fifth Circuit considered a challenge by
four Florida car dealership service advisors who alleged their employer failed
to pay overtime to which they were entitled under the FLSA.59  The court
exemptions must be narrowly construed.”  Letter from Twelve Members of Congress to
Richard M. Brennan, Dir., Office of Interpretations and Regulatory Analysis, Wage and
Hour Div., Emp’t Standards Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Labor (Sept. 26, 2008) [hereinafter
Letter from Twelve Members of Congress].  Other opponents of the 2008 proposal
included the AFL-CIO and the National Employment Lawyers Association.  Updating Reg-
ulations Issued Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 76 Fed. Reg. at 18832, 18838.
54 76 Fed. Reg. 18832, 18838 (Apr. 5, 2011).
55 See 29 C.F.R. § 779.372 (2011).  Thus, the new, post-2011 DOL Dealership Regula-
tion no longer contains section (c)(4), promulgated in 1971, which articulated,
Employees variously described as service manager, service writer, service advi-
sor, or service salesman who are not themselves primarily engaged in the work of
a salesman, partsman, or mechanic as described above are not exempt under [29
U.S.C. § 213(b)(10)(A)].  This is true despite the fact that such an employee’s
principal function may be disagnosing [sic] the mechanical condition of vehicles
brought in for repair, writing up work orders for repairs authorized by the cus-
tomer, assigning the work to various employees and directing and checking on
the work of mechanics.
29 C.F.R. § 779.372(c)(4) (1971) (emphasis added).
56 See supra text accompanying note 13.
57 See 29 C.F.R. § 779.372(c) (2011).  The Encino Motorcars court explained, “[the]
Plaintiffs [service advisors] do not fit within any of [the] definitions” of ‘salesman,’
‘partsman,’ or ‘mechanic,’ set forth in the DOL Dealership Regulation.  Navarro v. Encino
Motorcars, LLC, 780 F.3d 1267, 1271 (9th Cir. 2015).
58 See Encino Motorcars, 780 F.3d 1267; Walton v. Greenbrier Ford, Inc., 370 F.3d 446
(4th Cir. 2004); Brennan v. Deel Motors, Inc., 475 F.2d 1095 (5th Cir. 1973).
59 475 F.2d 1095, 1096 (5th Cir. 1973).
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unanimously rejected the challenge and accordingly declined to follow the
DOL Dealership Regulation’s assertion that “[e]mployees variously described
as . . . service advisor . . . are not exempt under [the Dealership Employee
Exemption].”60  The court held “a common sense interpretation and applica-
tion of [the Exemption] mandates inclusion of service [advisors] within its
scope.”61
Deel Motors, which was decided in 1973, preceded the Supreme Court’s
1984 decision in Chevron.  Therefore, the Fifth Circuit did not undergo the
two-step Chevron analysis when determining whether to defer to the DOL
Dealership Regulation.  Instead, the court sought to ascertain the “best inter-
pretation” of the Dealership Employee Exemption.62
The Fifth Circuit’s conclusion that service advisors are exempt under the
Dealership Employee Exemption rested on a two-pronged analysis.63  First,
the court opined, “service [advisors] are functionally similar to the mechanics
and partsmen who service the automobiles.  All three work as an integrated
unit, performing the services necessary for the maintenance of the cus-
tomer’s automobile.  The mechanic and partsman provide a specialized ser-
vice with the service [advisor] co-ordinating these specialties.”64  Second, the
court noted, “the intended scope of [the Dealership Employee Exemption] is
not entirely clear.”65  As a result, the court reasoned, when determining
which employees are “primarily engaged in selling or servicing” automobiles,
[i]n the absence of clear intent to the contrary, we [cannot] assume that
Congress intended to treat employees with functionally similar positions dif-
ferently, especially when the exemption by its own terms refers to “any sales-
man . . . engaged in selling or servicing automobiles[.]”  This is exactly what
a service salesman does.66
The Fifth Circuit found supplementary support for its interpretation of
the Exemption in the legislative history of the statute.67  First, the court cited
a report issued by the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare dur-
ing the drafting of the Exemption for its proposition that “[i]t is the intent of
this exemption to exclude from the coverage of [the FLSA overtime pay pro-
visions] all mechanics and salesman [and thus, service salesmen] . . . employed
by an automobile . . . dealership.”68  Second, the court quoted a statement
60 29 C.F.R. § 779.372(c)(4) (1973) (emphasis added).
61 Deel Motors, 475 F.2d at 1097.
62 Id.
63 See id. at 1097–98.
64 Id. at 1097 (emphasis added).
65 Id. at 1098.  As noted in Part II below, the Fifth Circuit overlooked conclusive evi-
dence regarding the intended scope of the Exemption, thus rendering this conclusion
erroneous.
66 Id. at 1097–98 (quoting Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-
601, § 209, 80 Stat. 830, 836).
67 See id.
68 Id. at 1097 n.2 (quoting S. REP. NO. 89-1487, at 32 (1966)).  In Encino Motorcars, the
Ninth Circuit criticized the Fifth Circuit for selectively quoting from this passage. See infra
text accompanying notes 99–103.  As explained in Section II.C, however, (a) it is unlikely
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from the Congressional Record that explained the Exemption was intended
for all commission-based employees of dealerships, such as salesmen,
partsmen, and mechanics.69  From this statement, the court reasoned that
because the plaintiff service advisors received a substantial part of their pay-
ment via commissions, they were therefore meant to be included as exempt
employees.70
Accordingly, the DOL Dealership Regulation’s declaration that service
advisors are not within the scope of the Dealership Employee Exemption was
overruled, and the plaintiff service advisors were held exempt employees not
entitled to overtime pay.71
C. Walton v. Greenbrier Ford, Inc. (Fourth Circuit)
In Walton v. Greenbrier Ford, Inc., the Fourth Circuit considered a chal-
lenge by a Virginia car dealership service advisor who alleged his employer
failed to pay overtime to which he was entitled under the FLSA.72  As was the
case in Deel Motors, the central issue in Greenbrier Ford was whether the court
should defer to the DOL Dealership Regulation, which stated “[e]mployees
variously described as . . . service advisor . . . are not exempt under [the Dealer-
ship Employee Exemption].”73  Unlike the court in Deel Motors, however, the
Greenbrier Ford court considered the issue after the Supreme Court decided
Chevron.
The Fourth Circuit nevertheless analyzed the DOL Dealership Regula-
tion under a standard less deferential than that set forth in Chevron.74  The
court explained “[i]n interpreting the validity of agency regulations, our
standard of review depends upon whether such regulation is legislative or
interpretive.”75  If the court found the DOL Dealership Regulation to be legis-
that the Ninth Circuit was correct in that analysis, and (b) it is clear that the Encino Motor-
cars court itself selectively quoted from this section of the report, omitting a critical sen-
tence central to its meaning.
69 Id. at 1098 n.4 (“I want to make sure that the intent of Congress is that those who
are primarily retail dealers engaged in selling . . . automobiles have this exemption for their
commission employees such as parts men and salesmen and mechanics.” (quoting 112 CONG.
REC. 11290 (1966) (statement of Rep. Andrews))).
70 Id. (“The exemption . . . was to be continued for salesman and mechanics in recog-
nition of the traditional incentive pay plans and irregular hours of such employees.”).
71 Id. at 1098.
72 370 F.3d 446, 449 (4th Cir. 2004).  The court noted “[f]actually, Deel is nearly on all-
fours with [this] case.” Id. at 450.
73 Id. at 451 (emphasis added) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 779.372 (2003)). Deel Motors,
decided in 1973, and Greenbrier Ford, decided in 2004, considered, in relevant part, identi-
cal versions of the DOL regulation in 29 C.F.R. § 779.372.  The regulation was first
changed in relevant, substantive part from its 1972 form in 2011. See supra Section I.A.
74 See Greenbrier Ford, 370 F.3d at 452.
75 Id. (emphases added).  The court explained, “Legislative regulations are those in
which ‘Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, [thus] there is an express
delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by
regulation.’” Id. (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
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lative it would afford the Regulation “controlling weight” under Chevron.76  If
the court found the Regulation to be interpretive it would give the Regulation
“considerable weight”77 and would “uphold [the Regulation] if [it] ‘imple-
ment[ed] the congressional mandate in a reasonable manner.’”78
The court found the DOL Dealership Regulation interpretive as to the
meaning of the Exemption’s term “salesman.”79  Therefore, rather than
reviewing the Regulation under Chevron’s “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the statute”80 framework, the court applied the less deferential
“reasonable[ness]” standard.81
The Fourth Circuit concluded the DOL Dealership Regulation should
not be given considerable weight because “the [DOL’s] interpretation of
[‘salesman’] is unreasonable, as it is an impermissibly restrictive construction
of the [Dealership Employee Exemption].”82  The court explained:
[The] FLSA itself exempts any salesman “primarily engaged in selling or ser-
vicing automobiles” from the overtime requirements.  However, [the DOL
Dealership Regulation] conflicts with FLSA’s statutory mandate in that it
restricts the definition of “salesman” to those employees “primarily engaged
in making sales or obtaining orders or contracts for sales [sic] of the vehicles.”
Because that restrictive regulatory definition of “salesman” unreasonably
implements the congressional mandate, we reject the [DOL’s] interpreta-
tion [of the definition of “salesman” set forth] in 29 C.F.R.
§ 779.372(c)(1).83
837, 843–44 (1984)).  On the other hand, “[a]n interpretive regulation serves to ‘clarify
ambiguous terms found in the statute or explain how a provision operates.’” Id. (quoting
Pelissero v. Thompson, 170 F.3d 442, 446 (4th Cir. 1999)).
76 Id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (emphasis added)).
77 Id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (emphasis added)).
78 Id. (quoting Pelissero, 170 F.3d at 446).  The Fourth Circuit cited Skidmore v. Swift &
Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), when setting forth its standard of review for interpretive regula-
tions. Greenbrier Ford, 370 F.3d at 452.  The Supreme Court in Christopher applied the Skid-
more standard, which is much less deferential than that of Chevron. See infra, Part III
(discussing the differences between Chevron and Skidmore deference).
79 Greenbrier Ford, 370 F.3d at 452.
80 Id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844).
81 Id. (quoting Pelissero, 170 F.3d at 446).  Three years after the Fourth Circuit’s deci-
sion in Greenbrier Ford, the Supreme Court held interpretive regulations are entitled to Chev-
ron scrutiny if certain requirements are met.  Thus, the DOL Dealership Regulation, even if
interpretive, is not automatically subject to a standard of review less deferential than that of
Chevron. See supra note 16.
82 Greenbrier Ford, 370 F.3d at 452.
83 Id. (first quoting 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(10)(A) (2000); then quoting 29 C.F.R.
§ 779.372(c)(1) (2003)).  The Greenbrier Ford court agreed with the Fifth Circuit’s decision
in Deel Motors by rejecting the DOL’s interpretation of 29 C.F.R. § 779.372.  However, the
Greenbrier Ford court distinguished itself from Deel Motors by refusing to follow the Fifth
Circuit’s “functionally similar” analysis.  The Greenbrier Ford court explained, “we decline to
apply the ‘functionally similar’ analysis [of] the Fifth Circuit . . . because [it] cannot be
squared with FLSA’s plain statutory and regulatory language.” Id. at 451.
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Satisfied that the Exemption’s “statutory text” was sufficient to support
its conclusion, the Greenbrier Ford court did not venture into the legislative
history of the Dealership Employee Exemption.84
D. Navarro v. Encino Motorcars, LLC (Ninth Circuit)
In Navarro v. Encino Motorcars, LLC,85 the Ninth Circuit considered the
five MB Encino service advisors’ challenge that the dealership failed to pay
overtime to which they were entitled under the FLSA.  Like the courts in Deel
Motors and Greenbrier Ford, the issue presented to the Encino Motorcars court
was whether it should defer to the DOL Dealership Regulation’s interpreta-
tion of the Dealership Employee Exemption.86
The Ninth Circuit analyzed the DOL Dealership Regulation under the
Chevron deference framework.87  At Chevron step one, the Encino Motorcars
court found the Dealership Employee Exemption ambiguous as to the defini-
tion of “salesman.”88  Accordingly, at Chevron step two, the court had to
determine whether the DOL Dealership Regulation was “arbitrary, capri-
cious, or manifestly contrary to” the Dealership Employee Exemption.89
Before completing the Chevron step two analysis, however, the Ninth Cir-
cuit provided an excellent summary of the differences between the Greenbrier
Ford court’s reading of the Dealership Employee Exemption (and also the
Montana Supreme Court’s similar reading of the statute in Thompson v. J.C.
Billion, Inc.90), and that of the DOL.91  The court, which made clear that the
difference of opinion between the Fourth Circuit/Montana Supreme Court
and the DOL rested upon the interpretation of the term “primarily
engaged,” explained,
[The Fourth Circuit and the Montana Supreme Court] read [the Dealership
Employee Exemption] as follows: “any salesman, partsman, or mechanic pri-
marily engaged in [the general business of] selling or service automobiles.”
Service advisors are “salesmen” because their job is to sell services for cars.
84 See id. at 451–53.
85 780 F.3d 1267, 1269–70 (9th Cir. 2015).
86 However, unlike the Deel Motors and Greenbrier Ford courts, which considered the
version of the DOL Dealership Regulation that existed between 1970 and 2011, the Encino
Motorcars court considered the post-2011 version of the Regulation.  The post-2011 Regula-
tion lacks its predecessor’s explicit statement that service advisors do not fall within the
Exemption.  This distinction is not significant; the post-2011 Regulation is not viewed as a
change in position from its predecessor with respect to the DOL’s belief that service advi-
sors are not within the scope of the Dealership Employee Exemption. See supra text accom-
panying notes 55–58.
87 Encino Motorcars, 780 F.3d at 1271 (“We conduct the familiar two-step inquiry to
determine whether to defer to the agency’s interpretation.”).
88 Id. at 1271–72 (“In sum, the statutory text and canons of statutory interpretation
yield no clear answer to whether Congress intended to include service advisors within the
exemption.”).
89 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984).
90 294 P.3d 397 (Mont. 2013).
91 Encino Motorcars, 780 F.3d at 1274.
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And service advisors are involved in the general business of “servicing auto-
mobiles,” because their role is to help customers receive mechanical work on
their cars.  Accordingly, service advisors fall within the statutory definition.
In effect, those courts held that that is the only reasonable reading of the
statute.
The [DOL] reads the [Exemption] differently: “any salesman,
partsman, or mechanic primarily [and personally] engaged in selling or ser-
vicing automobiles.”  Service advisors may be “salesmen” in a generic sense,
but they do not personally sell cars and they do not personally service cars.
Accordingly, service advisors fall outside the statutory definition.  In effect,
the [DOL] reads the statute as exempting salesmen who sell cars and
partsmen and mechanics who service cars.92
Turning to Chevron step two, the Ninth Circuit found reasonable the
DOL Dealership Regulation’s interpretation that service advisors are not
within the Exemption.93  The court set forth its reasoning in a lengthy con-
textual analysis that began with a hypothetical “dog-cat” analogy (which this
Note will discuss in detail below in Section II.B) to show that when a list of
disjunctive subjects is followed by a list of disjunctive verbs, it is not always
plausible to link each disjunctive subject to each disjunctive verb.94  The
court applied this theory to the Exemption, reasoning,
A natural reading of the text strongly suggests that Congress did not intend
that both verb clauses would apply to all three subjects.  For example, it is
hard to imagine, in ordinary speech, a “mechanic primarily engaged in sell-
ing . . . automobiles.”  That is, it seems that Congress intended the subject
“mechanic” to be connected to only one of the two verb clauses, “servicing.”
The nature of the word “mechanic” strongly implies the actions that the per-
son would take—servicing.  The same can be said of the subject “salesman.”
It is hard to imagine, in ordinary speech, a “salesman . . . primarily engaged
in . . . servicing automobiles.”  Congress likely intended the subject “sales-
man” to be connected to only one of the two verb clauses, “selling.”  The
nature of the word “salesman” strongly implies the actions that the person
would take—selling.95
The Ninth Circuit further justified the reasonableness of the DOL’s
reading of the Dealership Employee Exemption by noting, “[a]ll three sub-
92 Id. (emphases added). See also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 29, at 3
(“Every other court [than the Ninth Circuit] to consider this issue has . . . recognized that
the phrase ‘primarily engaged in . . . servicing automobiles’ encompasses service advisors
and partsmen who are engaged in the servicing process even though they do not personally
service vehicles.”).  The Encino Motorcars court agreed with the Fourth Circuit’s disapproval
of the Fifth Circuit’s “functionally similar” analysis in Deel Motors.  The Ninth Circuit
explained, “Deel Motors . . . pre-dated Chevron and the modern framework for deferring to
an agency’s interpretation. . . .  In that regard, we agree with the Fourth Circuit that . . .
[n]othing in the statutory text suggests Congress meant to exempt salesmen, partsmen,
mechanics, and any other employees with functionally similar job duties.” Encino Motorcars,
780 F.3d at 1274.
93 Encino Motorcars, 780 F.3d at 1273–77.
94 See id. at 1275.
95 Id. (citations omitted).
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jects (salesman, partsman, and mechanic) and both verbs (selling and servic-
ing) retain meaning; it is just that some of the verbs do not apply to some of
the subjects.  If the [DOL] read out a word altogether, its interpretation
likely would be unreasonable.”96
Addressing the legislative history of the Exemption, the Ninth Circuit
found no conclusive indicators of congressional intent regarding either the
intended status of service advisors under the exemption, or the intended
meaning of “primarily engaged.”97  However, the court found the “only possi-
ble exception” to the legislative history’s silence regarding the meaning of
“primarily engaged” laid in the same section of the Senate Committee on
Labor and Public Welfare report previously analyzed by the Deel Motors
court.98  The Ninth Circuit quoted the report as follows:
It is the intent of this exemption to exclude from the coverage of section 7
all mechanics and salesmen (other than partsmen) employed by an automo-
bile, trailer, truck, farm implement or aircraft dealership even if they work in
physically separate buildings or areas, or even if, though working in the prin-
cipal building of the dealership, their work relates to the work of physically
separate buildings or areas, so long as they are employed in a department
which is functionally operated as part of the dealership.99
The Ninth Circuit asserted, “[t]he Fifth Circuit quoted selectively from
that passage for the proposition that the committee intended to exempt all
mechanics and salesmen.”100  The court explained, “the quoted passage also
is found in earlier committee reports, which were written before the limiting
phrase [‘primarily engaged’] was added.”101  Therefore, the court reasoned,
“[b]ecause the passage appeared both before and after the addition of the
‘primarily’ proviso, the best reading of that passage is that the committee was
addressing what provisions apply to employees who work in separate build-
ings, not what types of salesmen are exempt.”102
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit concluded, “[i]n sum, there are good
arguments supporting both interpretations of the [E]xemption.  But where
there are two reasonable ways to read the statutory text, and the agency has
chosen one interpretation, we must defer to that choice.”103
96 Id. As noted below, the Ninth Circuit was misguided in making this assertion. Infra
Part II.
97 Encino Motorcars, 780 F.3d at 1275–77.
98 Id. at 1277.
99 Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 89-1487, at 32 (1966)).
100 Id.
101 Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 89-871, at 38 (1965)).  As noted in Section II.C below, the
Ninth Circuit badly ignored critical aspects of this section in both the Senate and House
reports it cited, making clear that its conclusion as to the “best reading” of the passage was
at best partially correct, and that the passage in fact does address “what types of salesmen
are exempt.”
102 Id. (emphasis added).
103 Id.
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II. TEXT AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE DEALERSHIP
EMPLOYEE EXEMPTION
At Chevron step two, in determining whether an agency has set forth a
reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute, courts typically base their
decisions on “a comparison of the agency’s interpretation with the language
of the statute and sometimes also with the legislative history and legislative
purpose of the statute.”104  In deciding the reasonableness of the DOL Deal-
ership Regulation, the Ninth Circuit and pre-Chevron Fifth Circuit did just
that—first analyzing the text of the Dealership Employee Exemption, and
then turning to its legislative history and purpose.105
Despite its extensive contextual and legislative history analyses, the
Ninth Circuit in Encino Motorcars neglected a significant aspect of the Dealer-
ship Employee Exemption—its inclusion of “partsman”—an element that dis-
credits the court’s holding that the DOL was reasonable in proclaiming
service advisors as outside the Exemption.  Additionally, the Encino Motorcars
court (and also the Deel Motors court thirty-two years earlier) overlooked legis-
lative history indicating Congress intended to include service advisors within
the Exemption’s definition of “salesman.”
Although the Greenbrier Ford court did not consult the legislative history
of the Exemption, the “partsman” exemption validates the Fourth Circuit’s
textually grounded conclusion that the only reasonable way to read the
Exemption is “any salesman, partsman, or mechanic primarily engaged in
[the general business of] selling or service automobiles.”106  Accordingly, the
DOL Dealership Regulation’s effective reading of the Exemption as “any
salesman, partsman, or mechanic primarily [and personally] engaged in sell-
ing or servicing automobiles” should not be afforded Chevron deference
because there is unambiguous textual and legislative intent for the inclusion
of service advisors within the Exemption’s definition of “salesman,” thereby
rendering the Regulation manifestly contrary to the statute.
A. Inclusion of “Partsman” Within the Exemption
In 1961, Congress effectively exempted any car dealership employee
from the FLSA’s overtime pay requirement.107  That law exempted “any
employee of a retail or service establishment that is primarily engaged in the
business of selling automobiles, trucks, or farm implements.”108
104 Note, The Two Faces of Chevron, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1562, 1568 (2007). See also Brian
G. Slocum, The Importance of Being Ambiguous: Substantive Canons, Stare Decisis, and the Central
Role of Ambiguity Determinations in the Administrative State, 69 MD. L. REV. 791, 824 (2010)
(“Legislative history has long been a tool that courts have used (including the Court in
Chevron) to search for indications of congressional intent.”).
105 Encino Motorcars, 780 F.3d at 1273–77; Brennan v. Deel Motors, Inc., 475 F.2d 1095,
1097–98 (5th Cir. 1973).
106 Encino Motorcars, 780 F.3d at 1274.
107 See Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-30, § 9(a)(19), 75
Stat. 65, 73.
108 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(19) (1964).
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As part of the FLSA amendments of 1966, however, Congress narrowed
the exemption to its current form, which exempts only “any salesman,
partsman, or mechanic primarily engaged in selling or servicing automo-
biles.”109  Congress’s ultimate decision to restrict the Exemption to “any
salesman, partsman, or mechanic primarily engaged in selling or servicing
automobiles” was not made arbitrarily.  Rather, differing positions existed
among three proposed FLSA-amending bills that were entertained by the
Eighty-Ninth Congress.110
The first bill would have removed in its entirety the exemption for all
dealership employees.111  The second bill would have exempted from the
FLSA overtime requirement “any salesman or mechanic” employed by a deal-
ership.112  Neither of these bills became law.
The third bill, H.R. 13712, enacted into law on September 23, 1966, as
the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, contained the “any salesman,
partsman, or mechanic primarily engaged in selling or servicing automo-
biles” language of the Dealership Employee Exemption.113  The language of
H.R. 13712, however, varied importantly before reaching its enacted form.
As initially introduced in the House on March 16, 1966, H.R. 13712, like
the second bill that did not become law, exempted “any salesman or
mechanic” employed by a dealership.114  Reported by the House on March
29, 1966, the bill added partsmen to the Exemption, which then read “any
salesman, mechanic, or partsman” employed by a dealership.115  This version
of H.R. 13712 passed the House on May 26, 1966, and, on May 27, 1966, was
read by the Senate and referred to the Senate Committee on Labor and Pub-
lic Welfare.116  Thus, none of these first three versions of H.R. 13712 con-
tained the limiting clause “primarily engaged in selling or servicing
automobiles” as seen in the enacted law; rather, they broadly exempted any
salesman, mechanic, or partsman employed by a dealership.
The Senate proposed noteworthy changes to H.R. 13712.117  As reported
by the Senate on August 23, 1966, the Exemption was altered to “any sales-
man (other than partsman) or mechanic primarily engaged in selling or ser-
109 Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, § 209, 80 Stat. 830,
836; (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(10)(A) (2012)).
110 See Pub. L. No. 89-601, § 209, 80 Stat. 830, 836 (1966); H.R. 10518, 89th Cong. § 209
(1965); H.R. 8259, 89th Cong. § 305 (1965).
111 H.R. 8259, 89th Cong. § 305 (1965).
112 H.R. 10518, 89th Cong. § 209 (1965).
113 Pub. L. No. 89-601, § 209, 80 Stat. 830, 836 (1966).
114 H.R. 13712, 89th Cong. § 209 (as introduced, Mar. 16, 1966).
115 H.R. 13712, 89th Cong. § 209 (as reported by H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, Mar.
29, 1966).
116 H.R. 13712, 89th Cong. § 209 (as passed by the House, May 26, 1966 and referred to
S. Comm. on Labor & Pub. Welfare, May 27, 1966).
117 See Navarro v. Encino Motorcars, LLC, 780 F.3d 1267, 1275–77 (9th Cir. 2015);
Brennan v. Deel Motors, Inc., 475 F.2d 1095, 1097 n.2 (5th Cir. 1973).
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vicing automobiles” employed by a dealership.118  This draft of the bill is
extraordinarily significant for two reasons.  First, the Senate disagreed with
the House’s inclusion of partsmen within the Exemption, and accordingly
rewrote the Exemption to specifically exclude partsmen.119  Second, it is the
first time the Exemption contained the controversial limiting clause “prima-
rily engaged in selling or servicing automobiles.”120
With respect to the inclusion (or exclusion) of partsmen, the Senate, in
the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare report analyzed by both
the Deel Motors and Encino Motorcars courts,121 explained that it removed
partsmen from the House version of the bill in order to “lessen the competi-
tive disadvantage of the wholesalers distributors who have had no exemption
from either minimum wage or overtime under the [FLSA].”122
The legislative history is devoid of any direct explanation as to why the
Senate added the “primarily engaged” requirement.  Accordingly, the legisla-
tive history is also silent as to Congress’s intended meaning of “primarily
engaged.”  As the Ninth Circuit explained, all that is known is that “sometime
in 1966 between May 27 [the date on which the version of the bill that passed
the House was referred to the Senate] and August 23 [the date on which the
Senate reported its amended version of H.R. 13712], the Senate added that
phrase.”123
What is known, however, are two important facts that allow a definitive
inference as to Congress’s intended meaning of “primarily engaged.”  First,
the Senate’s attempt to remove partsmen from the Exemption ultimately
failed; in its enacted form, the Exemption includes “any salesman, partsman,
or mechanic.”124  Second, although the Senate’s removal of partsmen was
rejected, in its enacted form the Exemption retains the Senate’s addition that
exempt dealership employees must be “primarily engaged in selling or servic-
ing automobiles.”125




121 See supra text accompanying notes 68, 99–103.
122 S. REP. NO. 89-1487, at 15 (1966).  Wholesale auto parts dealers—which in theory
employ only partsmen (they have no mechanics fixing cars, and no salesmen selling cars,
but only partsmen stocking parts)—would be required to pay partsmen overtime under
the House version of the bill.  This is because wholesalers do not sell to “ultimate purchas-
ers.”  Therefore, the Senate believed that by removing the partsmen exemption entirely,
wholesale auto parts distributors would be on a more equal playing field with retail dealer-
ships that also employed partsmen, but, under the House version of the bill, would not be
required to pay overtime to these employees.
123 Navarro v. Encino Motorcars, LLC, 780 F.3d 1267, 1276 (9th Cir. 2015).
124 See H.R. REP. NO. 89-2004, at 7, 19 (1966) (Conf. Rep.).
125 Id.
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B. “Partsman” Exemption as Conclusive Evidence of Exemption
for Service Advisors
The Dealership Employee Exemption’s inclusion of partsmen makes
clear that the only reasonable way to read the Exemption is “any salesman,
partsman, or mechanic primarily engaged in [the general business of] selling or
service automobiles.”126  Accordingly, the DOL Dealership Regulation’s
effective reading of the Exemption as “any salesman, partsman, or mechanic
primarily [and personally] engaged in selling or servicing automobiles” is man-
ifestly contrary to the intent of the statute, and should not be afforded Chevron
deference.
The Ninth Circuit’s dog-cat analogy explained,
The Fourth Circuit’s point is that, when Congress uses a list of disjunctive
subjects (here, “salesman, partsman, or mechanic”) followed by a list of dis-
junctive verbs (here, “selling or servicing”), the ordinary interpretation of
that construction is that each subject is linked with each verb.  For example,
if someone says, “if my dogs or cats are eating or drinking, then I know not
to pet them,” we understand that phrase to be all-encompassing: the speaker
refrains from petting a dog that is eating or drinking and a cat that is eating
or drinking.  It would contravene the speaker’s intent to include, for exam-
ple, only cats that were eating but to exclude dogs that were eating.
Critically, however, that analysis depends on context.  Consider this
slightly modified hypothetical: “if my dogs or cats are barking or meowing,
then I know that they need to be let out.”  The Fourth Circuit’s grammatical
interpretation of that phrase would include a meowing dog and a barking
cat.  But most English speakers would interpret the sentence to refer only to
a barking dog and a meowing cat.  At a minimum, that implicit limitation
would offer a reasonable interpretation of the speaker’s intent.127
Despite the Ninth Circuit’s assertion that analysis “depends on con-
text”128 in instances when a list of disjunctive subjects (here, “salesman,
partsman, or mechanic” and “dogs or cats”) is followed by a list of disjunctive
verbs (here, “selling or servicing” and “barking or meowing”) the court erro-
neously ignored the Exemption’s inclusion of partsmen.
In the dog-cat analogy, it is reasonable to interpret the sentence as refer-
ring only to barking dogs and meowing cats.  This is because, in that hypo-
thetical, the limiting of each disjunctive subject (dog or cat) to only one of
the disjunctive verbs (barking or meowing) is unambiguous.  As the Encino
Motorcars certiorari petition explains, “[m]eowing dogs and barking cats are
not covered because there are no such animals.”129
The same one-to-one subject-verb linking, however, cannot apply to the
Dealership Employee Exemption, which lists three disjunctive subjects (sales-
126 MB Encino has presented this same argument in its petition for writ of certiorari.
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 29, at 28 (“Congress’ inclusion of partsmen is
fatal to the Ninth Circuit’s [holding].”).
127 Encino Motorcars, 780 F.3d at 1275.
128 Id.
129 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 29, at 28.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-4\NDL414.txt unknown Seq: 21 11-MAY-16 9:55
2016] show  me  the  money 1727
man, partsman, or mechanic) to only two disjunctive verbs (selling or servic-
ing)—it is mathematically impossible.130  A partsman, therefore, must have
been understood by Congress to be “primarily engaged” in at least one of (a)
selling or (b) servicing automobiles.
Under the definition of “partsman” as it was understood by Congress in
1966 and the DOL ever since, the only manner in which a partsman can be
“primarily engaged” in at least one of (a) selling or (b) servicing automobiles
is if that partsman is “primarily engaged in [the general business of] selling or
service automobiles.”  The Congressional Record makes clear that Congress,
in enacting the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, defined
“partsman” as one who “classifies, shelves and dispenses parts used by
mechanics and sold to customers who come into establishments to make
purchases.”131  Similarly, in the DOL Dealership Regulation, the agency has
long defined “partsman” as “any employee employed for the purpose of and
primarily engaged in requisitioning, stocking, and dispensing parts.”132
Applying these definitions to the DOL’s effective reading of the Exemp-
tion, it is neither plausible to imagine a “partsman primarily [and personally]
engaged in selling automobiles,” nor a “partsman primarily [and personally]
engaged in servicing automobiles.”  First, a partsman’s duties are in no way
related to the selling of vehicles.133  Second, the mechanic—which, as
defined by the DOL, does “mechanical work . . . in the servicing of an auto-
mobile”134—is the only employee personally engaged in servicing vehicles
(i.e., the only person doing the actual servicing).135  By definition, the
partsman does not personally service vehicles.  Rather, the partsman merely
manages parts so the mechanic can personally service vehicles, whether that
be installing new parts, fixing existing parts, or otherwise.  As one New York
dealership explained, “to apply the [statutory] exemption only to ‘partsmen’
who [personally] work on vehicles would be to define these individuals as
mechanics, and thereby render the statutory use of the label ‘partsmen,’
superfluous.”136
Accordingly, the DOL’s interpretation of the Exemption is unreasonable
because (and despite the Ninth Circuit’s assertion to the contrary137) it reads
out the word “partsman” altogether.  As the Supreme Court explained, “one
of the most basic interpretive canons [is] that ‘[a] statute should be con-
strued so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoper-
130 Id. at 28–29.
131 112 CONG. REC. 20502 (1966) (statement of Sen. Bayh).
132 29 C.F.R. § 779.372(c)(2) (2011); 29 C.F.R. § 779.372(c)(2) (1971).
133 See supra text accompanying notes 131–32 (outlining the job duties of partsmen).
134 29 C.F.R. § 779.372(c)(3) (2011).
135 Merriam-Webster defines “personally” as “used to say that something was done or
will be done by a particular person and not by someone else.” Personally, MERRIAM-WEB-
STER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/personally (last visited Mar. 20, 2016).
136 McBeth v. Gabrielli Truck Sales, Ltd., 768 F. Supp. 2d 383, 388 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
137 See supra text accompanying note 96.
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ative or superfluous, void or insignificant.’”138  With respect to the
Dealership Employee Exemption, the only way in which this requirement can
be satisfied is if the Exemption is read as “any salesman, partsman, or
mechanic primarily engaged in [the general business of] selling or service
automobiles.”
Reading the Dealership Employee Exemption as “any salesman,
partsman, or mechanic primarily engaged in [the general business of] selling or
service automobiles,” gives proper effect to the Exemption’s inclusion of
partsmen and, consequently, brings service advisors within the scope of the
Exemption.139  Partsmen’s shelving and dispensing of parts used by mechan-
ics in servicing vehicles qualifies partsmen’s work as primarily engaged in the
general business of servicing automobiles.140  Critically, then, service advisors’
solicitation of repairs and maintenance qualifies service advisors as “sales-
men . . . primarily engaged in the general business of . . . servicing automo-
biles”—a service advisor is a salesman whose duties affect the whole of a
vehicle’s servicing.141  Therefore, service advisors are not entitled to overtime
pay because they fall within the scope of the Dealership Employee
Exemption.
C. Congressional Intent That Service Advisors Be Included
in the Definition of “Salesmen”
Although in and of itself the Exemption’s inclusion of “partsman” is
determinative as to exemption of service advisors, it is important to under-
stand the true meaning of the House and Senate committee reports analyzed
(and disagreed upon) by the Deel Motors and Encino Motorcars courts.  These
reports and related Congressional documents suggest, at the time the Dealer-
ship Employee Exemption was enacted, Congress considered service advisors
as within the definition of exempt salesmen.
In Deel Motors, the Fifth Circuit quoted a passage from a 1966 Senate
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare report for the proposition that the
138 Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009) (quoting Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S.
88, 101 (2004)).
139 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 29, at 26 (“[I]f . . . partsmen come
within the plain terms of the exemption because they are engaged in the general process of
selling or servicing automobiles rather than personally engaged in selling or servicing auto-
mobiles, then service advisors must also come within the terms of the exemption.”).  Thus,
reading the Exemption as, “any salesman, partsman, or mechanic primarily engaged in [the
general business of] selling or service automobiles” is not done for the purpose of incorporat-
ing service advisors within its scope.  Rather, the “in the general business of” interpretation
must be adopted in order to properly give effect to the Exemption’s inclusion of partsmen.
The inclusion of service advisors within the Exemption is a byproduct of this reading.
140 Merriam-Webster defines “general” as “involving, applicable to, or affecting the
whole.” General, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/general
(last visited Mar. 20, 2016).  Thus, a partsman’s duties affect the whole of a vehicle’s
servicing.
141 See also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 29, at 16 (“[A] service advisor is
the paradigmatic ‘salesman . . . primarily engaged in . . .  servicing automobiles.’”).
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Exemption was intended to apply to all dealership mechanics and salesmen,
including service advisors.142  In Encino Motorcars, the Ninth Circuit recog-
nized the same passage as the “only possible exception” to the legislative his-
tory’s otherwise silence as to the meaning of which salesmen (i.e., whether
service advisors) are “primarily engaged” in the selling or servicing of vehi-
cles.143  However, the Ninth Circuit criticized the Fifth Circuit for selectively
quoting from that passage, and argued that, because a similar passage also
appeared in a 1965 House Committee on Education and Labor report issued
before the “primarily engaged” requirement was added to the Exemption,
the passage was best interpreted as addressing what provisions apply to
employees who work in separate buildings, and not what types of salesmen
are exempt.144
As it turns out, the Ninth Circuit selectively quoted from the 1966 Senate
report, while the Fifth Circuit almost certainly did not.  In full, the relevant
texts of the 1965 House and 1966 Senate reports are as follows:
H. Comm. on Education and Labor S. Comm. on Labor and Public
(1965) Welfare (1966)
It is the intent of this exemption to ex- The exemption, unlike that contained in
clude from the coverage of section 7 all section 13(b)(19), is not limited to “retail”
mechanics and salesmen employed by dealerships.  It is the intent of this exemp-
an automobile, truck, farm implement, tion to exclude from the coverage of sec-
or aircraft dealership, even if they work tion 7 all mechanics and salesmen (oth-
in physically separate buildings or areas er than partsmen) employed by an auto-
so long as they are employed in a de- mobile, trailer, truck, farm implement
partment which is functionally operated or aircraft dealership even if they work
as part of the dealership.145 in physically separate buildings or areas,
or even if, though working in the princi-
pal building of the dealership, their
work relates to the work of physically
separate buildings or areas, so long as
they are employed in a department
which is functionally operated as part of
the dealership.146
In quoting the 1966 Senate report, the Ninth Circuit omitted the first
sentence, emphasized above, of that standalone paragraph147 that states
“[t]he exemption . . . is not limited to ‘retail’ dealerships.”148  In a preceding
section of the report, the Senate expressed its desire to remove partsmen
from the Exemption in order to mitigate a competitive disadvantage that
142 See supra text accompanying note 68.
143 See supra text accompanying note 98.
144 See supra text accompanying notes 100–03.
145 H.R. REP. NO. 89-871, at 38 (1965).
146 S. REP. NO. 89-1487, at 32 (1966) (emphasis added).
147 See supra text accompanying note 99.
148 S. REP. NO. 89-1487, at 32.
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would result for wholesale parts distributors.149  Thus, by editing the passage
(from the 1965 House report version) to (a) recognize that the Exemption is
not limited to retail dealerships and (b) say “all mechanics and salesman
(other than partsmen),” the Senate explicitly addressed what types of sales-
men are exempt.
During the drafting of the FLSA Amendments of 1966, Representative
Mark Andrews sought to “have clear congressional history”150 as to the pro-
posed separate buildings policy.  As Representative Andrews explained, at
that time the DOL’s position was that “any physically separate building is a
separate establishment.”151  Therefore, “since larger dealerships necessarily
occupy many buildings separated by streets or alleyways,” such dealerships
would have many salesmen, partsmen, and mechanics that, under the DOL’s
position, did not meet the Dealership Employee Exemption’s requirement
that the establishment for which they work be primarily engaged in selling
vehicles to ultimate purchasers.152  Recognizing that this would frustrate the
purpose of the Exemption, Representative Andrews indicated the House’s
“intent to be contrary to the [DOL’s then-existing separate building]
enforcement policy.”153
By retaining the separate buildings provision as set forth in the 1965
House report and discussed on the House floor, the Senate accepted the
House’s previous suggestion.154  However, the Senate supplemented that
suggestion with its desired removal of partsmen from the Exemption.
Accordingly—despite the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion partially to the con-
trary—the Senate report passage addresses both what provisions apply to
employees who work in separate buildings and also what types of salesmen
are exempt.
In turn, a further reading of the Exemption’s legislative history suggests
the Fifth Circuit, which read the Senate report’s phrase “all mechanics and
149 See supra text accompanying note 122.
150 112 CONG. REC. 11289 (1966) (statement of Rep. Andrews).
151 Id.; see also 29 C.F.R. § 779.305 (1966).
152 112 CONG. REC. at 11289 (statement of Rep. Andrews).  For example, in a large
dealership with multiple buildings, a mechanic might perform his duties in a building in
which no vehicle sales are made.  Under the then-existing DOL position, that mechanic
would be entitled to overtime pay because his employer would not qualify as a “nonmanu-
facturing establishment primarily engaged in the business of selling such vehicles or imple-
ments to ultimate purchasers” as is required by the Dealership Employee Exemption.  29
U.S.C. § 213(b)(10)(A) (2012).  Instead, because each building is a separate establish-
ment, only those salesmen, partsmen, and mechanics who perform their duties in build-
ings in which vehicle sales are made would be exempt.
153 112 CONG. REC. at 11289 (statement of Rep. Andrews).
154 See id. at 20506 (statement of Sen. Javits) (“The [1966 Senate Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare] report, at page 32, contains language which I proposed, to make it
clear that the exemption will extend to the employer even if certain of the employees are
separately housed.”).  The DOL conformed the Regulation to Congress’s separate build-
ings position in its original DOL Dealership Regulation. See 29 C.F.R. § 779.372 (1971); see
also Fair Labor Standards Act as Applied to Retailers of Goods or Services, 35 Fed. Reg.
5856, 5896 (Apr. 9, 1970) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 776).
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salesman” to include service advisors, almost certainly did not selectively
quote from the report.  In Encino Motorcars, the Ninth Circuit claimed there
is “no mention [in the legislative history of the Exemption] of service advi-
sors, by name or by role.  All references to ‘salesman’ appear to refer to an
employee who sells cars only.”155  Despite this assertion, it remains highly
plausible that the Fifth Circuit correctly determined the Senate intended to
include service advisors within the definition of “salesmen” for one signifi-
cant reason—the legislative history makes reference to service advisors.
The Dealership Employee Exemption’s legislative history almost cer-
tainly does refer to service advisors as “salesmen.”  Senator Jacob Javits, in sup-
porting the removal of “partsmen” from the Exemption, explained, “as far as
the automobile partsmen were concerned, they did work regular hours, they
were not, like the mechanic and the salesman, subject to call at any time that a
fellow’s car broke down.”156  By suggesting that both a mechanic and sales-
man are called when a vehicle breaks down, Senator Javits implied the vehi-
cle will be serviced, or at least that servicing of the vehicle will be considered
under those factual circumstances.  The salesman’s only potential role in
such servicing is to diagnose and solicit the necessary repairs—the job of the
service advisor.157  Had Senator Javits stated that only a mechanic is called
when a vehicle breaks down, that would suggest the mechanic is responsible
for diagnosing and soliciting repairs.  In that situation, the salesman would
not be called “at any time that a fellow’s car broke down,” but only if and
when the mechanic diagnosed the vehicle as irreparable, at which point the
salesman would be responsible for selling a new car.  But Senator Javits did
not say this.  Senator Javits explicitly stated that when a vehicle breaks down,
both a mechanic and salesman are called into duty.  Accordingly, he must
have considered service advisors as salesmen primarily engaged in servicing
automobiles.158
155 Navarro v. Encino Motorcars, LLC, 780 F.3d 1267, 1276 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing 112
CONG. REC. at 20504 (statement of Sen. Yarborough) (“It would not affect the salesman.
He can go out and sell an Oldsmobile, a Pontiac, or a Buick all day long and all night. . . .
The salesman tries to get people mainly after their hours of work.  In some cases a man will
leave his job, get his wife, and go to look at automobiles.”)).
156 112 CONG. REC. at 20506 (statement of Sen. Javits) (emphasis added).
157 This disproves the 2008 statement by members of Congress that, when enacting the
Dealership Employee Exemption in 1966, their predecessors (but with respect to Senator
Edward Kennedy—whose nearly forty-seven years of Senate service began in 1962—col-
leagues) “did not intend . . . to exempt service employees who sell mechanical services,
because the common understanding was that a car ‘salesman’ sells automobiles and that a
salesman does not . . . sell mechanical services.”  Letter from Twelve Members of Congress,
supra note 53, at 7.
158 This conclusion is consistent with the car dealership industry’s employment and
understanding of service advisors in 1966, the time the Exemption was enacted.  National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) decisions refer to “service salesmen” as early as 1938. See
Hudson & Terraplane Sales Corp., 8 N.L.R.B. 72, 74 (1938).  Although one early NLRB
decision classified service advisors as mechanics, see Charles Smith Nash Co., 83 N.L.R.B.
511, 512 n.5 (1949) (“[S]ervice salesmen are in fact mechanics, who examine a customer’s
car and prescribe the work required to recondition it.”), subsequent decisions uniformly
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In sum, the passage in the 1966 Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare report quoted by both the Deel Motors and Encino Motorcars courts
clearly considers what types of salesmen are exempt under the Dealership
Employee Exemption.  A closer look into the Exemption’s legislative history
confirms Congress intended to include service advisors within the scope of
“salesmen.”
III. ANALYZING THE EXEMPTION IN LIGHT OF CHRISTOPHER
In its 2012 decision in Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,159 the
Supreme Court resolved a circuit split over whether pharmaceutical sales rep-
resentatives (PSRs) are “outside salesmen” exempt from the FLSA’s mini-
mum wage and overtime pay provisions.160  This is the last time the Court has
considered the applicability of a specific FLSA exemption.161  Much like the
three federal appellate courts that have considered the Dealership Employee
Exemption, the Court in Christopher had to determine whether to afford def-
erence to the DOL’s position that PSRs are not exempt outside salesmen
(and are therefore entitled to overtime pay).162  In a close 5-4 decision the
Court denied deference to the DOL, holding that PSRs qualify as exempt
outside salesmen.163
In reviewing the DOL’s position on PSRs, the Christopher Court applied
Skidmore deference, a standard of review much less deferential than the Chev-
ron standard applied by the Ninth Circuit to the DOL Dealership Regula-
classified service advisors as salesmen, see, e.g., Story Oldsmobile, Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 1647,
1649 (1964) (“The service salesman is the first point of contact between [the dealership]
and the customer seeking repair work.”); Tulsa Hudson Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 646, 646 (1951)
(“The service salesman receives customers who drive their automobiles to the Employer’s
shop for repairs, diagnoses mechanical troubles, writes up customers’ repair orders, and
advises the mechanics as to the work required on the basis of the customers’ orders.”);
Hanna Motor Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 105, 107 (1951) (“The Employer has four service sales-
men in the service department.  These men receive automobiles that are brought into the
department for repairs, talk to the customers regarding what repairs are here necessary,
and prepare order blanks for the repairs.”); Yarbrough Motor Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1296, 1297
(1949) (“Service salesmen fall within the ‘salesmen’ classification.”).
159 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012).
160 Id. at 2161.  The FLSA exempts “outside salesmen” in 29 U.S.C. § 213(a).  There-
fore, unlike qualified dealership employees, who are only exempt from the FLSA’s over-
time pay provisions, outside salesmen are exempt from both the Act’s minimum wage and
overtime requirements. See supra note 9.
161 See Noel P. Tripp, Ninth Circuit Creates Circuit Split Regarding FLSA Classification of
Sales Advisor Position, JACKSON LEWIS (Mar. 31, 2015), http://www.wageandhourlawupdate
.com/2015/03/articles/department-of-labor/ninth-circuit-creates-circuit-split-regarding-
flsa-classification-of-sales-advisor-position/.
162 See Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2165.
163 See id. at 2172.  PSRs are “sales representatives whose primary duty is to obtain non-
binding commitments from physicians to prescribe their employer’s prescription drugs in
appropriate cases.” Id. at 2161.
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tion.164  This standard, set forth in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,165 unlike the
Chevron standard, does not defer to an agency’s interpretation “so long as it is
reasonable.  Instead, it is merely given ‘weight’ based on ‘the thoroughness
evident in [the agency’s] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its con-
sistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which
give it power to persuade.’”166  Due to this significantly less deferential stan-
dard of review, when reading the Christopher Court’s contextual analysis of
the outside salesmen exemption, it is difficult to draw inferences as to how
the Court might interpret the Dealership Employee Exemption in Encino
Motorcars.
Nevertheless, the Christopher majority articulated equitable justifications
for denying deference to the DOL’s interpretation of the outside salesmen
exemption.  These justifications are readily adaptable to the analysis of the
Dealership Employee Exemption, and thus, beyond the already conclusive
text and legislative history of the Exemption,167 they provide additional sup-
port for denying deference to the DOL Dealership Regulation.
A. Skepticism of Extensive Retroactive Liability in Light of Longstanding DOL
Guidance and Industry Practice
Like the plaintiff service advisors in Deel Motors, Greenbrier Ford, and
Encino Motorcars, the plaintiff PSRs in Christopher sought backpay for the over-
time to which they asserted entitlement.168  The Christopher majority took
issue with such a remedy.  The Court recognized the “[pharmaceutical]
industry’s decades-long practice of classifying [PSRs] as exempt employ-
ees.”169  Further, the Court explained, “Until 2009 [when the DOL first con-
cluded that PSRs are not outside salesmen], the pharmaceutical industry had
little reason to suspect that its longstanding [treatment of PSRs] as exempt
164 See id. at 2165–69; see also Michael Herz, Chevron Is Dead; Long Live Chevron, 115
COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1879 (2015) (“It is often said that [Chevron] requires ‘strong defer-
ence’ and [Skidmore requires] ‘weak deference.’”); Christopher J. Walker, How to Win the
Deference Lottery, 91 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 73, 75 (2013) (describing the Skidmore standard
as “less generous” than that of Chevron).
165 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
166 Walker, supra note 164, at 75 (alteration in original) (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at
140).  For an excellent summary of the why the Court reviewed DOL’s position on PSRs
under this less deferential standard, see Robert J. Hurtt, Jr., Not Making Sales Paid Too Well
for Pharmaceutical Reps: Why the Result in Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp. Makes
Sense Even if Its Statutory Construction Does Not, 57 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1019, 1034 (2013); Hsuan
Li, Note, Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corporation: A Tough Pill to Swallow for Phar-
maceutical Sales Representatives?, 33 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 768, 785–90 (2013).
167 See supra Part II.
168 See Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2164; Navarro v. Encino Motorcars, LLC, 780 F.3d 1267,
1270 (9th Cir. 2015); Walton v. Greenbrier Ford, Inc., 370 F.3d 446, 449 (4th Cir. 2004)
(noting the plaintiff service advisor asserted “he was owed compensation for 888.75 over-
time hours”); Brennan v. Deel Motors, Inc., 475 F.2d 1095, 1096 (5th Cir. 1973).
169 Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2168.
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outside salesmen transgressed the FLSA.”170  This is because “the DOL only
once [in a 1945 opinion letter] directly opined on the exempt status of
[PSRs] prior to 2009,”171 which shows “the DOL never initiated any enforce-
ment actions with respect to [PSRs] or otherwise suggested that it thought
the industry was acting unlawfully [in treating PSRs as exempt].”172  As a
result, the Court expressed skepticism of retroactive liability, stating,
[W]here . . . an agency’s announcement of its interpretation is preceded by
a very lengthy period of conspicuous inaction, the potential for unfair sur-
prise is acute. . . .
. . . It is one thing to expect regulated parties to conform their conduct
to an agency’s interpretations once the agency announces them; it is quite
another to require regulated parties to divine the agency’s interpretations in
advance or else be held liable when the agency announces its interpretations
for the first time . . . and demands deference.173
This unfavorable stance towards significant retroactive FLSA liability is
equally—if not more—applicable to the treatment of service advisors under
the Dealership Employee Exemption.  Unlike the pharmaceutical industry,
car dealerships were provided a litany of DOL guidance regarding the inclu-
sion of service advisors within the Exemption.  This guidance spanned four
decades and included the 1978 opinion letter, 1987 DOL Handbook, and
2008 formal proposal to amend the Dealership Regulation.174  These admin-
istrative materials not only pronounced the DOL’s position that service advi-
sors are exempt salesmen, a position directly contrary to the longstanding
language of the DOL Dealership Regulation, but also, in the 1987 Hand-
book, unequivocally stated the agency’s intention to amend the Regulation
to reflect this position.175
Further, the DOL’s treatment of the Dealership Employee Exemption
was subject to a lengthy period of inaction.  The agency first proposed service
advisor-related amendments to the DOL Dealership Regulation in 2008,
twenty-one years after it pledged to do so, and then ultimately decided to
reject those proposed regulations in 2011.176  As the Christopher majority sug-
170 Id. at 2167.
171 Id. at 2168 n.16.
172 Id. at 2168.
173 Id.; see also Hurtt, supra note 166, at 1034 (“[T]he Court found no ‘fair warning,’
given that the interpretation would impose massive liability on Glaxo for conduct that had
occurred before the agency’s interpretation had been advanced.” (quoting Christopher, 132
S. Ct. at 2167)).
174 See supra text accompanying notes 48–51; see also Brief for Amici Curiae National
Automobile Dealers Ass’n et al. in Support of Petitioner at 4–5, Encino Motorcars, LLC, v.
Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 890 (2016) (No. 15-415), 2015 WL 6735818, at *4–5 (“For more than 40
years, the nation’s automobile dealerships have relied on the FLSA’s [Dealership
Employee Exemption] in classifying and compensating their Service Advisors. . . .  [Service
advisors] are generally classified as exempt employees, often under [the Dealership
Employee Exemption].”).
175 See supra text accompanying note 49.
176 See supra text accompanying notes 49–54.
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gested, “[o]ther than acquiescence [to the industry’s treatment of its employ-
ees], no explanation for the DOL’s inaction is plausible.”177
Accordingly, the car dealership industry had even less reason to suspect
its longstanding treatment of service advisors as exempt salesmen trans-
gressed the FLSA than did the pharmaceutical industry with respect to PSRs.
As opposed to the DOL’s near silence concerning its stance on PSRs, the
agency was highly vocal in its belief that service advisors were overtime-
exempt salesmen under the Dealership Employee Exemption.  Due to the
DOL’s lengthy period of inaction, coupled with consistent authority on
which dealerships denying overtime to service advisors could rely, the poten-
tial for “unfair surprise” in imposing significant retroactive liability on car
dealerships is even greater than that which existed for pharmaceutical com-
panies.  Therefore, affording deference to the DOL’s ultimate position that
service advisors are entitled to overtime pay would be highly problematic.
B. Non-Exemption Would Contravene Longstanding Industry Payment Practices
The Christopher majority took issue with the fact that classifying PSRs as
non-exempt employees entitled to overtime would frustrate the “apparent
purpose of the FLSA’s exemption for outside salesmen.”178  The Court
explained the outside salesmen exemption is (in part) grounded in “the
belief that exempt employees. . . . perform[] a kind of work that ‘[is] difficult
to standardize to any time frame and could not be easily spread to other
workers after 40 hours in a week, making compliance with the overtime pro-
visions difficult.’”179  Recognizing that the plaintiff PSRs worked “10 and 20
hours outside normal business hours each week,”180 the Court concluded
PSRs “are hardly the kind of employees that the FLSA was intended to pro-
tect.  And it would be challenging, to say the least, for pharmaceutical com-
panies to compensate [PSRs] for overtime going forward without
significantly changing the nature of that position.”181
This same analysis is applicable to the treatment of service advisors
under the Dealership Employee Exemption.  As Senator Javits noted, unlike
partsmen, service advisors do not work regular hours, but are instead “subject
to call at any time that a fellow’s car broke down.”182  Similarly, in a poetic
precursor to the Ninth Circuit’s dog-cat analogy, one Senator explained,
“Salesmen are a little different breed of cats, because they go out at unusual
hours.”183  Accordingly, it can be inferred that the nature of an employee’s
work schedule was a central factor in Congress’s determination of which
177 Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2168.
178 Id. at 2173.
179 Id. (quoting Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, Administrative,
Professional, Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 69 Fed. Reg. 22122, 22124 (Apr. 23,
2004) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 541)).
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 See 112 CONG. REC. 20506 (1966) (statement of Sen. Javits).
183 Id. at 20504 (statement of Sen. Bayh).
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dealership employees to exempt.  Although the Senate ultimately lost its bat-
tle to remove partsmen from the Exemption,184 its reliance on work sched-
ules as support for their removal makes clear the Dealership Employee
Exemption was, like the outside sales exemption, at least in part grounded in
“the belief that exempt employees. . . . perform[ ] a kind of work that ‘was
difficult to standardize to any time frame and could not be easily spread to
other workers after 40 hours in a week, making compliance with the overtime
provisions difficult.”185
Therefore, it would frustrate the purpose of the Dealership Employee
Exemption to entitle service advisors to overtime pay.  As the Encino Motorcars
certiorari petition explains, “[D]ealerships and their service advisors have
negotiated mutually beneficial compensation plans in good-faith reliance on
decades of precedent holding that such employees are exempt from the
FLSA’s overtime requirements.”186  Thus, in the same vein as the Christopher
majority’s concerns for the pharmaceutical industry should PSRs have gained
entitlement to overtime pay, car dealerships would face substantial obstacles
in restructuring the service advisor position should the Court hold service
advisors are entitled overtime going forward.187
CONCLUSION
The FLSA Dealership Employee Exemption’s inclusion of “partsman”
demonstrates the only reasonable way in which the Exemption can be read is
“any salesman, partsman, or mechanic primarily engaged in [the general busi-
ness of] selling or servicing automobiles.”  As a byproduct of this reading, car
dealership service advisors definitively fall within the statute’s exemption
from entitlement to overtime pay.188  Further, the Exemption’s legislative
history makes clear that Congress, in enacting the Fair Labor Standards
184 See supra text accompanying notes 118–26.
185 Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2173 (quoting Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for
Executive, Administrative, Professional, Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 69 Fed.
Reg. at 22124).  But see 112 CONG. REC. at 20505 (statement of Sen. Clark) (suggesting the
establishment of the Dealership Employee Exemption was, at least in part, the result of the
House of Representatives “yield[ing] . . . to the importunings of the automobile lobby.”).
But not all Senators agreed.  See id. at 20506 (statement of Sen. Javits) (“I do not subscribe
to the idea that this [Exemption] is for any automobile lobby.”).
186 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 890
(2016) (No. 15-415), 2015 WL 5783210.
187 See Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2173 (“[I]t would be challenging, to say the least, for
pharmaceutical companies to compensate [PSRs] for overtime going forward without sig-
nificantly changing the nature of that position.”).
188 Importantly, this lack of ambiguity ensures that inclusion of service advisors within
the Exemption does not violate the Court’s mandate that “[FLSA] exemptions are to be
narrowly construed against the employers seeking to assert them and their application lim-
ited to those [contexts] plainly and unmistakably within their terms and spirit.”  Arnold v.
Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392 (1960) (citing Mitchell v. Ky. Fin. Co., 359 U.S. 290,
295 (1959)).
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Amendments of 1966, intended service advisors to be included within the
scope of the Dealership Employee Exemption.189
Accordingly, in deciding Encino Motorcars, the Supreme Court should
not afford the DOL Dealership Regulation Chevron deference because it is
manifestly contrary to the Exemption.  Other than the Ninth Circuit, every
court that has considered the FLSA’s exemption of service advisors, includ-
ing the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Fifth Circuits,
numerous other U.S. district courts, and the Montana Supreme Court, has
reached this conclusion.190  The similar factual background of Christopher v.
SmithKline Beecham Corp., the Court’s most recent foray into the applicability
of a specific FLSA exemption, suggests, beyond an interpretation of the Deal-
ership Employee Exemption itself, additional grounds under which the
Court may resolve the service advisor-circuit split in favor of the Fourth and
Fifth Circuits.
Resolution in favor of the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Greenbrier Ford and
the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Deel Motors is necessary to avoid disruption of
the longstanding approach towards service advisors by car dealerships nation-
wide.  If the DOL’s interpretation of the Exemption is upheld, car dealer-
ships and service advisors alike will face significant hurdles in re-attaining the
mutually beneficial employment relationship arranged under the assumption
that service advisors are included within the Dealership Employee
Exemption.
If the Supreme Court’s decision in Encino Motorcars sides with the Ninth
Circuit, congressional action to override such a decision is plausible.191
When the DOL broke its pledge to change the DOL Dealership Regulation
to reflect the position that service advisors fall within the Dealership
Employee Exemption, Congress promptly showed disapproval of the agency’s
backpedaling by attaching a limitation rider to 2012 and 2013 appropriations
bills that explicitly barred the DOL from enforcing its position on the FLSA’s
exemption of service advisors.192  Any future legislative action, though, may
depend on the balance of power in Congress.193
189 See supra Section II.C.
190 See supra text accompanying note 25.
191 For an excellent summary of recent Supreme Court statutory interpretation deci-
sions overridden by Congress, see generally Matthew R. Christiansen & William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions,
1967–2011, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1317 (2014).
192 See Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-175, § 104, 126
Stat. 1313, 1315 (2012) (providing funds only for projects authorized in the previous fiscal
year); Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, § 113, 125 Stat. 786,
1064 (2011) (“None of the funds made available by this Act may be used by the Secretary
[of Labor] to administer or enforce [the DOL Dealership Regulation].”).
193 The 2008 Letter from Twelve Members of Congress, supra note 53, which argued
the Dealership Employee Exemption did not intend to exempt service advisors, was signed
by two Democratic members of the House of Representatives (George Miller and Lynn
Woolsey), nine Democratic Senators (Sherrod Brown, Hillary Rodham Clinton, Christo-
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pher J. Dodd, Tom Harkin, Edward M. Kennedy, Barbara A. Mikulski, Patty Murray, Barack
Obama, and Jack Reed), and then-independent Senator Bernard Sanders, who later
became a candidate for the Democratic nomination for President in the 2016 election.
